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NO RESTORATION, NO REHABILITATION: SHADOW DETENTION
OF MENTALLY INCOMPETENT NONCITIZENS
SARAH SHERMAN-STOKES*
I. INTRODUCTION

O

RIGINALLY from Haiti, Martin1 immigrated to the United States as
a teenager with his mother and two brothers, all of them Lawful Permanent Residents. Sometimes living with his older brother, sometimes on
the street, Martin had always required extra help to perform daily tasks.
He never graduated from high school, and indeed barely made it through
the ninth grade. Conversations with Martin were often short and repetitive. Especially during times of stress, Martin struggled to understand concepts that his family thought were basic and routine—like how to make a
cup of coffee or sign his name. His speech was difficult to understand and
he could not maintain a job for more than a few weeks at a time. When
Martin was twenty-nine years old, he entered a major department store
and, without paying, took several packages of men’s t-shirts and underwear. He then walked to a local Dunkin’ Donuts, where he fell asleep for
the night. Martin was arrested, charged with larceny, and convicted. Despite being a lawful permanent resident, Martin’s conviction, combined
with a previous nonviolent larceny offense, subjected Martin to deportation. And so, after completing his sentence in criminal custody, Martin
was transferred to immigration detention. Immediately aware that something about Martin was different, other detainees contacted representatives of a local nonprofit who regularly visited the detention center,
pleading with them to take on Martin’s case and represent him in removal
proceedings. “He talks to himself” and “he just keeps repeating his name
and saying thank you,” they implored. Martin’s family did not know how
to contact him, and Martin could not remember their full names or telephone numbers.

* Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Lecturer and Clinical Instructor, Boston University
School of Law. J.D., Boston College Law School, B.A., Bates College. I am grateful
to my colleagues, Professors Muneer Ahmad, Jason Cade, Lindsay Harris, Laila
Hlass, Mary Holper, Kari Hong, Daniel Kanstroom, Naomi Mann, Karen Pita Loor,
and Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia for their thoughtful suggestions and insights. This
Article also benefitted from the feedback of participants at the New York
University School of Law Clinical Writers’ Workshop (2016). Finally, thank you to
Noah Potash for his helpful research assistance.
1. “Martin” is a pseudonym for one of the author’s former clients from the
Political Asylum/Immigration Representation (PAIR) Project, a nonprofit legal
service provider representing detainees and asylum seekers. See Pair Project,
https://www.pairproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/M3S4-DR4E] (last visited Oct.
30, 2017). Identifying details have been changed to protect his identity.
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During his removal proceedings, Martin was ultimately represented
by attorneys at the local nonprofit organization contacted by his fellow
detainees, who were able to reach one of Martin’s brothers, obtain past
criminal records, contact Martin’s therapist, and obtain evidence that Martin had previously been found incompetent to stand trial in a criminal
case. At his removal hearing, Martin seemed to have little understanding
of where he was or the high stakes he was facing. He repeated his name,
again and again, and explained to the judge that he “just went to Dunkin’
Donuts” and didn’t understand why he was there. He pleaded to go
home, but did not remember his address.
Ultimately, the immigration judge found that Martin was incompetent to proceed. Reviewing the list of safeguards2 he could consider in
Martin’s case that might help protect Martin’s rights and enable the proceedings to continue, the immigration judge determined that none would
be sufficient. Though the immigration judge wished to terminate removal
proceedings—allowing Martin to remain a lawful permanent resident and
be released from immigration custody—the Department of Homeland Security initially objected, arguing that the immigration judge lacked authority to order termination. The proceedings came, at least temporarily, to a
standstill. Because he was subject to mandatory detention, Martin’s detention also continued, with no foreseeable end in sight.
At present, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detains
34,000 noncitizens on any given day.3 This number is expected to grow
substantially, as President Trump has made immigration enforcement, detention, and deportation a cornerstone of his campaign and presidency.4
Indeed, one of President Trump’s first actions as President was to announce vastly expanded enforcement efforts.5 With increased enforcement, detention, and deportation, the rights of the most vulnerable—in
particular the mentally ill and incompetent—will only be further jeopardized. In fiscal year 2015, ICE recorded 90,276 “mental health interven-

2. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 478 (B.I.A 2011) (providing list
of safeguards).
3. See Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH.
POST (Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quo
ta-drives-immigration-detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a1a919f2ed890_story.html?utm_term=.98347bf2b290 [https://perma.cc/SMS
243S5].
4. See Jessie Hellman, Trump Vows to Deport Millions Immediately, THE HILL
(Nov. 13, 2016, 10:43 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidentialraces/305774-trump-vows-to-deport-millions-of-criminal-undocumented [https://
perma.cc/6PCK-5WJR] (vowing to deport “probably 2 million—it could even be 3
million”).
5. See Press Release, The White House, Executive Order: Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immi
gration-enforcement-improvements [https://perma.cc/J9ZW-KH5G].
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tions”6 for immigrant detainees in ICE custody.7 This is a staggering 64%
increase in mental health interventions since fiscal year 2012.8 There is
no doubt that noncitizens in immigration detention are suffering from
mental illness and incompetency at significant numbers. And more than
that, it is well documented that prolonged detention, and even short-term
incarceration, has a negative, long-term impact on the psychological
wellbeing of migrants.9 Fortunately, the last five years has heralded a
shift—and indeed, significant advancement—in how the rights of mentally ill and incompetent noncitizens are protected. The Board of Immigration Appeals10 and federal district courts11 are increasingly recognizing
that extra procedural protections and safeguards must be put in place to
ensure that the fundamental fairness of removal proceedings remains intact, even when noncitizens are mentally ill or incompetent. Scholars, similarly, are increasingly engaged in a conversation about what additional
rights and protections are needed to ensure fairness in removal proceedings for these uniquely vulnerable noncitizens and detainees.12 And yet,
challenges persist.
6. See Max Siegelbaum, Detention Centers, Bracing for Flood of New Arrivals, Are
‘Set up to Fail’ Immigrants with Mental Illness, STAT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://
www.statnews.com/2016/12/16/immigrants-mental-health/?s_campaign=TW
[https://perma.cc/WCH7-V2B4] (explaining that mental health interventions in
ICE custody “can include everything from relaxation exercises to cognitive behavioral therapy to prescription of psychotropic medication”).
7. See Detainee Health Care—FY2015, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/dhc-fy15 [https://
perma.cc/ P7BK-Y59J].
8. See A Day in the Life of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
news/library/factsheets/pdf/day-in-life-ero.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PBW-MH29].
9. See Allen S. Keller et al., Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers, 362 LANCET
1721, 1721–22 (2003); Derrick Silove et al., Policies of Deterrence and the Mental
Health of Asylum Seekers, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 604, 605–06 (2000); Zachary Steel et
al., Impact of Immigration Detention and Temporary Protection on the Mental Health of
Refugees, 188 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 58, 63 (2006); see also DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 7–13 (2012) (explaining that detention
centers “create or aggravate psychological or psychiatric disorders” and that care
available was often “insufficient or inappropriate”).
10. See, e.g., Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 612 (B.I.A. 2015) (holding
that where respondent’s mental health may impact their testimony, immigration
judge should “generally accept that the applicant believes what he has presented”);
Matter of E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 136 (B.I.A. 2013) (requiring special protections for service of Notice to Appear where respondent’s mental incompetence is
“manifest”). But see Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 339 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that mental illness is consideration to be left to criminal courts and cannot be
considered in determination whether offenses are particularly serious under sections 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
11. See, e.g., Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014
WL 5475097, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (requiring appropriate safeguards
ensuring fairness).
12. See, e.g., Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due Process Rights of
Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373,
379–83 (2011); Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to
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Specifically, what is an immigration judge to do when a respondent is
found incompetent, and no adequate safeguards are available? Nationwide data on the number of noncitizens who have been found incompetent in removal proceedings is not yet maintained or available.13
However, we know that the number of mentally ill and incompetent noncitizen detainees is substantial and, in many cases, their disability is
profound.14
In contrast to other kinds of judicial proceedings,15 there are no
mechanisms in place for the immigration court, the Department of Homeland Security, or the respondent or their counsel, to seek restoration of
competency. Further, unlike in criminal proceedings, no clear, explicit
authority currently exists for an immigration judge to release the respondent or dismiss the proceedings—in this case, order termination—where
competency is unlikely to be restored and where no safeguards can adequately protect that respondent’s rights. In these cases, largely, but not
always, unrepresented, incompetent respondents languish in immigration
detention, unable to pursue relief from removal or to be released from
detention.16 Indeed, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez himself remained detained,
and forgotten, for nearly five years after an immigration judge found him
incompetent.17 This Article argues that following a finding of incompetence by an immigration judge, and where no adequate safeguards are
Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 696 (2013); Sarah
Sherman-Stokes, Sufficiently Safeguarded?: Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1058 (2016); Amelia Wilson
et al., Addressing All Heads of the Hydra: Reframing Safeguards for Mentally Impaired
Detainees in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315,
340 (2015); Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the Madness: The
Right to Court Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 15–19 (2013).
13. See Conversation with Office of the General Counsel, Executive Office for
Immigration Review (June 6, 2016) (notes on file with author).
14. See, e.g., First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11, Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
2014) (describing petitioner-plaintiff in that case as mentally incompetent and suffering from mental retardation and noting that he was “forgotten in a facility for
more than four and a half years” after being identified as incompetent; further
noting that his case is “not unique” and going on to describe other mentally ill and
incompetent detainees and class members who suffer from schizophrenia and
psychosis).
15. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(f) (West 2015) (describing
process by which incompetent defendants in criminal court in Massachusetts can
secure dismissals on basis of their incompetency).
16. See, e.g., Sherman-Stokes, supra note 12, at 1056 (describing ICE resistance
to releasing incompetent respondents even where immigration judge has ordered
administrative closure; also describing immigration judge’s reluctance to order termination, or even administrative closure, unless respondent was being transferred
to state mental hospital).
17. See First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No.
CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).
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available, the immigration judge should be authorized to terminate removal proceedings and order the release of the respondent. Subjecting
this subgroup of respondents to continued detention and removal proceedings in this context violates section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in programs
conducted by federal agencies, in this case, the Department of Justice.
Continued detention and removal proceedings—in a system which provides inadequate care and procedural protection—denies this subgroup of
respondents meaningful access to the courts. Release to access adequate
mental health care, and in some cases, termination of proceedings, are
thus the only “reasonable accommodations” available to this subset of incompetent respondents.
While immigration judges not only have the authority to terminate
proceedings where no safeguards are adequate to protect the respondent’s rights, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) should
amend the regulations to make this authority explicit, even, if necessary,
over the objection of the Department of Homeland Security trial counsel.
This does not require that immigration judges terminate in all cases—
indeed, the author acknowledges that such a requirement could privilege
detained incompetent respondents over non-detained incompetent respondents. However, in order to ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act, the options available should be release, and continued removal
proceedings, or termination of proceedings and concomitant release.
The unacceptable alternative is that incompetent respondents in custody
will continue to face unconstitutional, prolonged, and indefinite detention and will be unable to meaningfully access the courts and participate
in their removal proceeding. Alternative solutions, including bond hearings, habeas challenges, and congressional action are unreliable, inefficient, or implausible, leaving action by EOIR as the only suitable remedy
to protect the rights of detained, incompetent respondents.18
This regulatory “fix” builds on the important and thoughtful recommendations of other scholars and advocates writing about mental competency in immigration removal proceedings.19 This Article, and the
18. Because they are uniquely vulnerable and more likely to be unrepresented by an attorney, this Article speaks only to the rights of detained, incompetent respondents. However, several of the arguments presented here in favor of
regulatory change are equally applicable to non-detained, mentally incompetent
respondents.
19. See, e.g., Clapman, supra note 12, at 394 (arguing for right to counsel for
mentally ill and incompetent); Marouf, supra note 12, at 967 (arguing for substantive right to competence in removal proceedings); Aimee L. Mayer-Salins,
Fast-Track to Injustice: Rapidly Deporting the Mentally Ill, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 545, 562 (2016) (arguing that section 504 of Rehabilitation Act requires
that mentally incompetent noncitizens be provided with additional protections in
fast-track removal proceedings); Sherman-Stokes, supra note 12, at 1057 (arguing
that role of the immigration judge in competency determinations must be
changed and that opinion of mental health professionals should be central to determinations of mental competency in order to protect fundamental fairness of
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regulatory changes it proposes, are especially timely. As discussed in
greater detail in Part II of this Article, immigration courts, the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement have
devoted increasing attention and guidance, as well as published, precedential case law, to issues of mental competency in the last five years.
Moreover, following re-argument in October 2017, as explained in Part
III, the Supreme Court is currently considering Jennings v. Rodriguez,20
which will decide whether noncitizens held in prolonged ICE detention
are eligible for a bond hearing. These two themes—mental competency
and prolonged detention—are the foundation of this Article.
Part II of this Article will describe the rights and procedures present
in removal proceedings for incompetent, detained respondents. This section describes the current state of the law for incompetent, detained respondents and the limited rights and remedies available to them. This
section further examines the current application of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to certain mentally incompetent noncitizen respondents
in removal proceedings. This section will also identify the current questions that remain in the competency realm, including the restoration of
competency and civil commitment.
Part III of this Article will examine the prospect of prolonged and
indefinite detention facing incompetent, detained respondents in removal
proceedings. This section will review the case law on indefinite, prolonged, and mandatory detention in immigration removal proceedings
and analyze the applicability of case law that relates specifically to the “special justifications” for the prolonged and indefinite detention of the mentally ill.21
Part IV of this Article will examine the role of immigration judges and
their regulatory authority, which while limited in certain areas, is expansive in others. This section will explore arguments as to the sufficiency of
immigration judges’ current regulatory authority to release respondents
from custody and terminate proceedings, and why and where those regulations may fall short.
Part V of this Article will argue that EOIR should amend the regulations to grant explicit regulatory authority to the immigration judge to
release incompetent respondents or terminate removal proceedings,
where no safeguards can adequately protect the rights of the respondent,
in order to comply with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This section
proceeding); Wilson et al., supra note 12, at 330 (arguing that counsel should be
appointed when court is presented with “indicia” of incompetence, rather than
after adjudication of incompetence); Wilson & Prokop, supra note 12 (arguing for
provision of court appointed guardian ad litem for mentally ill Respondents appearing pro se).
20. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.,
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
21. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (first citing Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); then citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
356 (1997)).
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will also respond to a critique of this suggested reform, namely the potential risks of providing release from custody for certain mentally incompetent noncitizens. Finally, this section will further explore why alternative
solutions, including bond hearings, habeas challenges, and congressional
action are unreliable, inefficient, or implausible.
II. MENTAL COMPETENCY

IN

IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

This section will provide an overview of the state of the law on mental
competency in immigration removal proceedings, as well as present application of the Rehabilitation Act to protect the rights of mentally incompetent respondents facing deportation. The Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) recognizes that noncitizens facing removal from the United
States may suffer from incompetence.22 But it was not until the last five
years that immigration courts have begun to engage in meaningful consideration and application of a scheme of rights and protections for mentally
incompetent respondents.
A. Mental Competency in Immigration Removal Proceedings
Today, competency is presumed in removal proceedings23 and courts
have held that even where a respondent is incompetent, immigration removal proceedings may go forward.24 The standard for mental compe22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2012); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 449 (1992) (concluding that presumption of competence does not violate the
Due Process Clause).
23. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (B.I.A. 2011) (citing MunozMonsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008)) (finding that it is noncitizen’s
burden to first raise issue of competency).
24. See, e.g., Munoz-Monsalve, 551 F.3d at 6–8 (holding that immigration
judge’s failure to sua sponte order competency evaluation of represented alien did
not violate alien’s due process rights, as it is advocate’s role, not immigration
judge’s, to broach issue of mental competence when alien’s incompetence is not
evident from record of hearing); Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir.
2006) (holding that immigration judge had no obligation under either statute or
regulation to consider represented alien’s mental competency because procedural
safeguards they envision were already in place); Sanchez-Salvador v. I.N.S., 33 F.3d
59, 1994 WL 441755, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 1994) (unpublished table decision)
(“Lack of competency, however, does not prevent a judge from determining either
deportability or whether to grant relief. As we held in Nee Hao Wong v. INS . . . an
alien can obtain a full and fair hearing despite being incompetent. This was the
case here. Sanchez-Salvador’s incompetence did not prevent him from presenting, through counsel, a strong case that relief is warranted.”); In re James, A040 015
111, 2009 WL 2171712, at *2 (B.I.A. June 26, 2009) (“In this instance . . . the
respondent’s counsel failed to request that an evaluation of the respondent’s competency be undertaken. The failure to raise the competency issue in a timely manner renders an ensuing appellate claim of error on this basis particularly weak. . . .
Moreover, contrary to the substantive due process protection from trial and conviction to which a mentally incompetent criminal defendant is entitled, removal proceedings may go forward against incompetent aliens.” (internal citations
omitted)); Matter of Sanchez, A37 616 891, 2006 WL 2008263, at *2 (B.I.A. May
24, 2006) (“The respondent was represented at the hearing; therefore, his rights
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tency in immigration removal proceedings is not unlike the standard set
out in the criminal court:
[t]he test for determining whether an alien is competent to participate in immigration proceedings is whether he or she has a
rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of
the proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative
if there is one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.25
Of course, one significant difference, which will be considered in
greater depth in Section V of this Article, is that the mental competency
standard in removal proceedings does not contemplate an attorney—or
even a legal representative—in all cases, meaning that many mentally ill
and incompetent respondents represent themselves, pro se, when facing
the very real prospect of deportation.
1. Matter of M-A-MThe standard for mental competency in immigration removal proceedings was set out in Matter of M-A-M-26 where, for the first time, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) squarely confronted the issue of
mental competency head on.27 In Matter of M-A-M-, the Board set forth
specific instructions for when and how immigration judges should make
competency determinations when they suspect that a respondent before
them is not competent to proceed.28 Specifically, an immigration judge is
first instructed to look for “indicia of incompetency.”29 Once an immigration judge detects indicia of incompetency, the Board recommends asking
the respondent simple questions about the proceedings, granting a continuance to allow parties to gather or submit relevant evidence, requesting
a psychological evaluation, and allowing for a change of venue so that a
respondent can receive medical care or counsel.30 Finally, where an immigration judge finds that a noncitizen “lacks sufficient competency to
were adequately protected.”); Matter of H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 358, 359 (B.I.A. 1954)
(holding that requirements of fair hearing had not been violated in deportation
proceedings involving alien of unsound mind, where notice of hearing had been
served on alien and his wife, arrangements were made to protect alien’s interests
by having doctor in attendance at hearing, and alien was represented by legal
counsel who was given privilege of introducing evidence and cross-examining
witnesses).
25. M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479.
26. 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011).
27. See id. at 474.
28. See id. at 479–81.
29. See id. at 479.
30. See id. at 481–82 (providing instructions for judges’ incompetency
determinations).
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proceed,” then she “shall prescribe safeguards.”31 The Board has provided a “non-exhaustive” list of safeguards32 that an immigration judge
may implement in order to ensure that the respondent’s rights are protected in the removal proceeding. These safeguards include:
refusal to accept an admission of removability from an unrepresented Respondent; identification and appearance of a family
member or close friend who can assist the Respondent and provide the court with information; docketing or managing the case
to facilitate the Respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical treatment in an effort to restore competency; participation of a guardian in the proceedings;
continuance of the case for good cause shown; closing the hearing to the public; waiving the Respondent’s appearance; actively
aiding in the development of the record, including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses; and reserving appeal
rights for the Respondent.33
Finally, the Board suggests that where this list is insufficient, “alternatives” may be available—but notes only administrative closure among
them.34
2. Application of the Rehabilitation Act and Franco Litigation
The Rehabilitation Act of 197335 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in programs conducted by federal agencies and related matters.36 Relevant to this discussion, “Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]
states that ‘no qualified individual with a disability in the United States
shall be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under’ any program or activity that either receives Federal financial assistance or is conducted by any Executive agency”—for example, a
removal hearing, conducted by EOIR, an agency housed within the Department of Justice.37 Through section 504, the Rehabilitation Act essentially extends civil rights protections to those with disabilities and attempts
31. See id. at 478–81. For a more detailed discussion of the protocol around
identifying competency issues and reliance on mental health evaluations, see Sherman-Stokes, supra note 12.
32. See M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483.
33. Id.
34. See id. (“[T]he Immigration Judge may pursue alternatives with the parties, such as administrative closure, while other options are explored, such as seeking treatment for the respondent.”).
35. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796l).
36. See CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO DISABILITY RIGHTS
LAWS (July 2009), https://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm#anchor65610 [https://
perma.cc/MX3M-EDG7].
37. See id.
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to dismantle the many barriers faced by people with disabilities in accessing public services and institutions.
Two years after Matter of M-A-M-, in April 2013, following a class action
lawsuit brought by the ACLU and others, a federal district court issued an
injunction affecting three states and countless mentally ill and incompetent respondents.38 In Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder,39 the district court held
that in order to comply with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, ICE, the
Attorney General, and EOIR are required to provide legal representation
to immigrant detainees with mental disabilities who are unable to represent themselves in California, Arizona, and Washington.40 The court
articulated the nature of the legal right at stake as ensuring that disabled
detainees are afforded meaningful participation in their removal proceedings.41 The court explained that provision of counsel was the reasonable
accommodation by which disabled detainees could exercise this right on
par with non-disabled detainees.42
This Article advances the reasoning in Franco to further ensure that
the rights of a subgroup of mentally incompetent detainees—those for
whom no safeguards are adequate—are protected. Specifically, the serious mental disabilities of these detainees, detained in the custody of an
agency, which has no procedures for competence restoration and concedes to the non-treatment of certain incompetent respondents,43 leads to
disability discrimination. For this subgroup of detainees, detention becomes prolonged and potentially indefinite—their cases are often continued pending the remote possibility of competency restoration without
treatment, or their cases may be administratively closed, a scheme under
which DHS is free to, and often does, continue detention.44 This Article
argues that for this group of detainees, the authority to release them or
terminate proceedings is the only reasonable accommodation compliant
with the Rehabilitation Act.45
38. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL
3674492, at *10 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 23, 2013).
39. No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23,
2013).
40. See id. at *20.
41. See id. at *15. (stating legal right at issue).
42. See id. at 7–8.
43. See Decision of the Immigration Judge, Matter of K.D. (Dec. 1, 2015)
(copy on file with author) (in which DHS asserts that it, “could not and would not
. . . provide treatment” of the incompetent respondent while she was detained in
their custody).
44. See First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 31, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder,
No. 10-CV-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).
45. Cf. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 n.21 (1985) (stating that “[t]he
regulations implementing Section 504 are consistent with the view that reasonable
adjustments in the nature of the benefit must be made to assure meaningful access.” (citation omitted)).
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3. The Post-Franco Landscape
Shortly after Franco, the EOIR provided additional guidance and instruction on the treatment of mentally ill and incompetent respondents,
to be gradually implemented in courts across the country.46 In addition to
sample lists of questions that immigration judges can use when conducting
a judicial inquiry into competency, this guidance includes when and how
to request a mental health evaluation as well as when and how to provide a
qualified representative.47 Though announced in December 2013, at the
time of writing, these additional guidelines had only been rolled out in a
handful of cities across the United States.48
Elaborating on the decisions in Franco and Matter of M-A-M-, the Board
of Immigration Appeals has made a number of decisions in the last four
years regarding the procedure and protocol to be followed in the case of a
mentally ill or mentally incompetent respondent. From credibility assessments,49 to service of the Notice to Appear,50 to who bears the burden of
proof to establish competency,51 and the immigration judge’s discretion
in implementing safeguards,52 the Board has struggled to present a coher46. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PHASE I OF PLAN
PROVIDE ENHANCED PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter EOIR, Phase I],
https://immigrationreports.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/eoir-phase-i-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB5D-A26R].
47. See id.
48. In June 2016, the Author filed a FOIA request to obtain information
about the information, education and training provided to immigration judges on
matters of mental competency. Freedom of Information Act Response, Executive
Office for Immigration Review FOIA # 2016-23345 (July 19, 2016) (CD-ROM on
file with author) [hereinafter EOIR FOIA Response] (showing that the Phase I
Plan has been rolled out in Denver, Colorado; El Paso, Texas; Houston, Texas; and
Miami, Florida and showing PowerPoint slides used to train immigration judges on
competency matters).
49. See Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 609 (B.I.A. 2015) (addressing
credibility assessments in asylum cases and holding that, “[i]f an applicant for asylum has competency issues that affect the reliability of his testimony, the Immigration Judge should, as a safeguard, generally accept his fear of harm as subjectively
genuine based on the applicant’s perception of events”).
50. See Matter of E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 136 (B.I.A. 2013) (requiring that
where evidence of incompetency is “manifest,” Notice to Appear, or immigration
charging document, should be served not just on respondent, but also on “a person with whom the Respondent resides” and a relative or guardian, or someone
“similarly close to the Respondent”).
51. See Matter of J-S-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 679, 683 (B.I.A. 2015) (holding that
“neither party bears a formal burden of proof in immigration proceedings to establish whether or not the respondent is mentally competent, but where indicia of
incompetency are identified, the Immigration Judge should determine if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the respondent is competent” (citation omitted)).
52. See Matter of M-J-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 773, 775 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that,
in incompetency cases, immigration judges maintain discretion to implement appropriate safeguards they deem appropriate). Though outside the scope of this
Article, it is worth noting that the Board, in this case, seems to fundamentally misTO
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ent narrative around the rights and protections afforded to mentally incompetent respondents. Most relevant to the discussion in this Article,
however, is that no precedential guidance currently exists on when,
whether, and how to order termination of removal proceedings when no
other safeguards can adequately protect the rights of a mentally incompetent respondent.53 While administrative closure—simply removing a respondent’s case from the docket—is mentioned in the “non-exhaustive”
list of safeguards enunciated by Matter of M-A-M-, administrative closure is
often an empty gesture for detained respondents. By taking their cases off
the docket, administrative closure provides no mechanism for their release from custody because they remain in immigration removal proceedings. Moreover, Matter of M-A-M- suggests administrative closure as an
option “while other options are explored, such as seeking treatment for
the Respondent”54 or pursuing restoration of competency.55 But this is
inapposite for a sizeable class of detained, incompetent respondents,
whose incompetency persists, unresolved, despite medication and treatment.56 Administrative closure in such cases keeps respondents indefinitely detained, a fruitless exercise of potentially indefinite duration.57 As
one court opined, “there is something fundamentally unfair in keeping a
. . . case open where the defendant, as a result of his incompetency, will
never be in a position to challenge it on the merits.”58 As explained further in Part III, in an administrative-closure-only regime, detained, menunderstand the role of an attorney, finding representation to be an adequate and
sufficient safeguard of a respondent’s rights even where it is well documented that
the respondent completely refuses to cooperate with the attorney or even appear
at the time and place of the removal proceeding.
53. This Article does not concede that termination is, currently, impermissible. In fact, in a recent Board decision in which the Board could have explicitly
held that termination was impermissible, the Board held that immigration judges
have discretion to implement the safeguards they deem most suitable in a given
case. See id.
54. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 483 (B.I.A. 2011).
55. See In re Benitez-Lopez, A092 298 255, 2014 WL 3698191, at *3 (B.I.A.
2014) (“Administrative closure in cases involving competency issues may provide
an opportunity for a respondent to be restored to competency.”).
56. See, e.g., First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11, Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, Case No. 10-CV-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
2014) (describing petitioner-plaintiff in that case as mentally incompetent and suffering from mental retardation and noting that he was “forgotten in a facility for
more than four and a half years” after being identified as incompetent; further
noting that his case is “not unique” and going on to describe other mentally ill and
incompetent detainees and class members who suffer from schizophrenia and psychosis); see also Decision of the Immigration Judge, Matter of K.D. (Dec. 1, 2015)
(copy on file with author).
57. See, e.g., Complaint at 11, Franco-Gonzalez, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx),
2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (describing how Mr. Franco-Gonzalez
was detained in ICE custody for nearly five years after finding of incompetency).
58. See Massachusetts v. Guinta, No. 2004-00088, 2011 WL 3480959, at *2
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2011).
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tally incompetent respondents face prolonged, and potentially indefinite,
detention in a carceral setting where they are unlikely to receive any therapeutic treatment or meaningful attempts at competency restoration.
B. Competency Restoration and Civil Commitment
While there exists a technical, if evolving, framework for identifying
competency issues, making competency determinations, and even implementing certain procedural safeguards, significant questions remain about
other measures to be taken in the case of a mentally incompetent respondent. For example, what, if any steps can be taken to restore the respondent’s competency? Who will bear the cost and responsibility? Who can
order such measures? How, if at all, can or should the parallel civil commitment system interact with immigration removal proceedings? What authority, if any, does or should an immigration judge have regarding civil
commitment?
First, where a respondent is found incompetent the question arises
whether his or her competency can be restored. The Board in Matter of
M-A-M- hinted at this, ever so briefly, noting that “seeking treatment for
the Respondent” could be a basis for administrative closure, but did not
expand further.59 Following Matter of M-A-M-, the Board, in an unpublished and non-precedential decision, seems to further contemplate that
administrative closure may be used as a safeguard in this situation in order
to “provide an opportunity for the Respondent to be restored to competency.”60 In the case of non-detained respondents, the question of treatment and competency restoration presents fewer questions as to cost,
resources, and procedure. However, in the case of respondents who are
detained at government expense in ICE detention, many questions remain. The Board has not opined further—in a published opinion—as to
whether competency restoration efforts for detained, incompetent respondents would or should be undertaken by ICE, whether a parallel civil commitment proceeding should be initiated and what, if any, authority
immigration judges have in regards to these potential courses of action.
In another case involving a detained, incompetent respondent, the Board
remanded proceedings where the immigration judge ordered a respondent to be civilly committed to a state hospital following a finding of incompetency.61 In this case, the Board stated that the immigration judge
did not have the authority to order such conditions of release but also
repeated DHS’s assertions that DHS “could not and would not . . . provide
treatment” of the respondent while she was detained in their custody.62
Such assertions seem unsurprising—resources for the mentally ill in ICE
59. See M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483.
60. See Benitez-Lopez, 2014 WL 3698191, at *3 (citing Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I.
& N. Dec. 688, 696 (B.I.A. 2012)).
61. See Decision of the Immigration Judge, Matter of K.D. (Dec. 1, 2015)
(copy on file with author).
62. See id.
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detention centers are sorely lacking.63 By ICE’s own admission, noncitizens with mental illness “would benefit from improved staffing, appropriate housing, access to step down services, and specialized case
management” while in ICE detention.64 But they cannot provide such services; nor can the detained noncitizen seek them out themselves. With
ongoing litigation and growing uncertainty and incongruity around these
issues, the Board seems interested and even poised to issue instruction,
recently calling for amici to weigh in on the impact of civil commitment
on immigration detention and removal proceedings.65
Meanwhile, FOIA responses from the EOIR reveal that instruction regarding competency restoration and civil commitment is currently absent
from immigration judge training, as neither are mentioned in the more
than forty pages of instruction currently provided to immigration judges
under the Phase I program.66 Among other options, at the recommendation of an immigration judge, a concurrent, parallel proceeding could be
undertaken in the state or probate court to pursue civil commitment for
the respondent following a termination order. The immigration judge
would not have the authority to herself commit the respondent but could
condition her release upon a referral to probate court. This is not to suggest that the civil commitment system is without flaws. Too often, the
mentally ill in civil commitment are in correctional facilities, facing punishment instead of treatment.67 Indeed, the calls for reform of the civil
commitment system are many, including changes to the legal criteria required for commitment and increasing the possibility of less restrictive al63. See, e.g., ACLU, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
FACILITIES, 6–8 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/unsr_briefing_materials.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MKD3-THCN] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
64. See DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (2009).
65. See Amicus Invitation No. 16-06-21 (Commitment to Mental Health Facility), BD.
OF IMMIGR. APPEALS (June 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/868666/
download [https://perma.cc/7W8Y-ATA5] (asking “(1) Is a respondent who has
been committed to a mental health treatment facility ‘detain[ed] . . . in custody’ or
‘release[d]’ within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1)? Does this depend on
the nature of the commitment arrangement? If so, what terms must be imposed as
part of the commitment arrangement to ensure that it equates to detention?; (2) Is
commitment to a mental health treatment facility appropriate where a respondent
has a mental health condition that causes him or her to be a danger if at liberty in
the United States? If so, what terms must be imposed as part of the commitment
arrangement to reasonably assure the safety of the community?; (3) Is commitment to a mental health treatment facility appropriate where a respondent has a
mental health condition that causes him or her to pose a risk of flight such that no
bond could reasonably assure his or her presence? If so, what terms must be imposed as part of the commitment arrangement to reasonably assure the respondent’s presence at future proceedings?”).
66. See EOIR FOIA Response, supra note 48.
67. See, e.g., Katie Lannan, Disability Law Group Urges Changes, Receivership for
Bridgewater State Hospital, WBUR (June 27, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/
2016/06/27/disability-law-group-changes-bridgewater-state-hospital [https://per
ma.cc/453X-4B8B].
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ternative placements68 and outpatient and community treatment
options.69
Whatever the Board decides, it is not clear that any statutory or regulatory authority currently exists to allow an immigration judge to order
civil commitment, or related conditions of release, for an incompetent,
detained noncitizen, and a thorough exploration of this question is
outside the scope of this Article.70 However, because at this juncture,
meaningful efforts at competency restoration in ICE custody seem unlikely, and because absent a parallel state court process civil commitment
remains untenable, the remainder of this Article will consider the prolonged and indefinite detention now facing incompetent, detained, noncitizen respondents.
III. THE LOOMING PROSPECT OF PROLONGED AND INDEFINITE DETENTION
FOR MENTALLY INCOMPETENT RESPONDENTS
Where the immigration judge determines that no safeguards are sufficient to protect the respondent’s rights, the immigration judge may be
inclined to administratively close the case. As explained above, for detained respondents, this decision invites the possibility of indefinite detention in immigration custody. To fully understand the reality of this
prospect for mentally incompetent detained noncitizens, it is necessary to
briefly describe the history and scale of immigration detention in the
United States.
A.

The Creation and Expansion of Immigration Detention

Where previously states had used their police power to enforce immigration law and detain suspected noncitizens, federal immigration detention began in 1882 with the creation of a federal immigration inspection
system.71 Immigration detention has historically been considered a civil,
temporary measure—designed simply to ensure that noncitizens appear at
their removal hearings and then, where applicable, to ensure their orderly
68. See, e.g., Francis J. O’Connor, Mental Health Law and Civil Commitment: Litigation and the Need for Further Reform, 4 BOS. BAR ASS’N HEALTH L. REP. 22, 25
(2009).
69. See, e.g., Dan Moon, The Dangerousness of the Status Quo: A Case for Modernizing Civil Commitment Law, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 209, 233 (2014); see also Legal Issues,
NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/About-NAMI/PolicyPlatform/9-Legal-Issues [https://perma.cc/ABU3-NZYH] (last visited Aug. 19,
2016).
70. The Author acknowledges however, that the Board may be seeking such
authority or trying to locate such authority in the already existing law. See Amicus
Invitation No. 16-06-21 (Commitment to Mental Health Facility), supra note 65.
71. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1996);
Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 21–22 (2010).
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removal or exclusion from the United States.72 As far back as the late
1800s, some special attention was reserved for the mentally ill.73 Upholding the detention of Chinese noncitizens in 1896, the Supreme Court explained, “[w]e think it clear that detention or temporary confinement, as part
of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens” is valid.74 But over the course of the twentieth century, this system of “temporary confinement” has shifted—becoming
something more than temporary, it is now deeply permanent, ingrained in
the fabric of our deportation regime.75
During the twentieth century, detention expanded as immigration enforcement intensified and courts upheld detention-without-bail schemes
for the undesirable noncitizens of the moment.76 This increasing emphasis on prolonged detention was only further amplified in the 1980s and
1990s as Congress vastly expanded the detention system, enacting a regime of mandatory detention77 and adding new grounds of removal that
72. See WILSHER, supra note 9, at 7–13 (discussing legal origins of immigration
detention).
73. See id. (“Whilst ‘arrest’ of some sort, usually on ships, was entailed by inspections, longer term incarceration, motivated by both humanitarian and exclusionary impulses appears only to have occurred in cases of illness, insanity or
destitution. There were in any event only a small number of beds to hold such
persons.”).
74. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (emphasis added). But see David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1016 (2002) (“[T]he Court in Wong Wing applied to
immigration detention the same principle that it has subsequently applied in other
civil detention cases: an absolute prohibition of the use of civil detention for punitive ends.”).
75. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 228–30 (2007); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information
Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 137–38 (2013)
(describing dramatic expansion of immigration detention since the mid-1990s).
76. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 547 (1952) (upholding, against
Due Process challenge, the detention without bail of noncitizens with alleged ties
to Communism); see also WILSHER, supra note 9, at 7–8 (describing use of immigration detention as tool of racial discrimination and to silence political dissidents);
Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 L. & HIST. REV. 69, 74 (2003) (noting
that “[b]etween 1892 and 1907 the Immigration Service deported only a few hundred aliens a year” but explaining that thereafter, wave of anti-communist sentiment gripped country, prompting legislation that encouraged arrest and
deportation of “immigrant anarchists and communists”). These efforts
“culminat[ed] in the Palmer Raids,” during which “authorities arrested 10,000 alleged anarchists and ultimately deported some five hundred. See id. Much of this
enforcement activity was done “under the guidance of the Justice Department’s
‘alien radical’ division, headed by a young J. Edgar Hoover.” See David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 995 (2002). The Immigration Act of 1924 eliminated
the statute of limitations for deportation, prompting “a dramatic increase in the
number of deportations.” See Ngai, supra, at 76.
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). Under the mandatory detention statute,
ICE may hold certain categories of noncitizens without giving them an opportunity
to request review or release from custody. These categories include, among several
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would automatically, and in some cases retroactively and without review,
trigger such detention.78 Largely driven by an economic downturn, the
escalating war on drugs,79 and fears of domestic terrorism,80 the
mandatory detention statute and expanded removal grounds have produced staggering results. Today, the federal government has in detention
34,000 suspected noncitizens on any given day81—up from less than 7,000
in 199482 and roughly 2,200 in the 1980s.83 While not all of these cases
involve detained respondents, as of June 2016, there were over 500,000
immigration removal cases pending in immigration courts across the
country.84 In December 2012, the most recent year for which data was
available, ICE reported 4,793 detainees who had already spent at least six
months in ICE custody and still had not been released.85 For these detainees the average length of detention was more than one year.86 Of course,
others, noncitizens who have “committed crimes of moral turpitude”; noncitizens
who have two or more criminal convictions; and noncitizens who have committed
any drug related offense. See id. For a more detailed history of mandatory detention legislation, see generally Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference
to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 345–54 (David A. Martin & Peter
H. Schuck eds., 2005).
78. See generally Das, supra note 75, at 141; see also generally 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
79. See César Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1415 (2014) (“Congress in effect envisioned immigration detention as a central tool in the nation’s burgeoning war on drugs.”).
80. See Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime:
Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 890
(2015) (describing how mandatory detention statute was product of several cooccurring factors, including “a slumping economy, rising crime, and terrorism”).
81. See Regarding a Hearing on Immigration Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) (statement of John Morton, Director, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement).
82. See DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES? 6 (Sept. 2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ immigrant-detention-can-ice-meet-its-legal-imperatives-and-case-management-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/49CE-DQWC] (noting more than six-fold increase in
detention since 1994).
83. See Administration Presses Policy of Incarcerating Illegal Aliens, CONG. Q. (Feb.
16, 1985), reprinted in Oversight Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 53 (Mar. 28, 1985).
84. See Alicia Caldwell, Federal Immigration Court Backlog Tops 500,000 Pending
Cases, CNS NEWS (Jul. 20, 2016, 05:45 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/federal-immigration-court-backlog-tops-500000-pending-cases [https://
perma.cc/7WJ2PZ8Y] (reporting that according to EOIR, there are now 500,051
cases in backlog); Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of July 2017,
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE: IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php [https://perma.cc/
8DKN-YY6H] (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
85. See Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE: IMMIGR. (June 3, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321/#f3 [https://perma.cc/5MNT-KQ4T].
86. See id.
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immigration detention also has its costs—for taxpayers, the federal government, detainees and their families, and perhaps more abstractly but no
less acutely, on entire communities who feel the absence of parents,
caregivers, and breadwinners.87
B. Legal Challenges to Immigration Detention: An Overview
As recently as 1953, the Supreme Court upheld prolonged, and even
indefinite detention in the service of immigration enforcement. Ignatz
Mezei, a longtime resident of the United States and cabinetmaker in Buffalo, New York, spent nineteen months abroad in Eastern Europe before
attempting to return to the United States.88 Upon his attempted reentry,
he was held without charge in an Ellis Island prison and was suspected of
being a Communist sympathizer. After Mezei challenged the constitutionality of his detention, the Supreme Court held that while his presence on
Ellis Island gave him standing to request habeas relief, he had not actually
“entered” the United States and was subject to the rules of exclusion—
meaning he was not entitled to any of the due process protections available to those who have gained admission to the United States.89
But concurrent with the expansion and increasingly prolonged nature of immigration detention in the United States, there have been significant legal challenges to the kind of detention originally permitted under
Shaughnessy v. Mezei.90 In 2001, in the case of two noncitizens detained for
approximately seven years and four years, respectively, the Supreme Court
considered whether and for how long the government may detain a noncitizen with a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.91 Holding that
the Constitution does not allow indefinite detention of noncitizens, as
such detention would raise “serious constitutional problem[s],” the Supreme Court ruled that, “the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s
demands, limits an alien’s post-removal period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United
States.”92 While the government argued that the statute set “no limit” on
the length of permissible detention post-removal order, the Supreme
Court set six months as the appropriate and reasonable period after which
the government must rebut a showing that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”93
87. For an excellent summary of the financial impact of detention, see Das,
supra note 75, at 143–45.
88. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953); A Haven for Mezei is
Being Negotiated, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1953), http://www.nytimes.com/1953/04/
25/archives/a-haven-for-mezei-is-being-negotiated.html [https://perma.cc/S5XHHEKX].
89. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213 (“In sum, harborage at Ellis Island is not an entry
into the United States.” (citation omitted)).
90. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
91. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
92. See id. at 689–90.
93. See id. at 701.
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Four years later, in Clark v. Martinez,94 the Supreme Court considered
whether the analysis and decision in Zadvydas v. Davis95 would similarly
apply to an inadmissible noncitizen—that is, someone who had not yet
been admitted to the United States, though was physically present inside
the country.96 Because the statute could not mean one thing in Zadvydas
and another in Clark,97 the Court concluded that there was a similar prohibition on the indefinite detention of inadmissible noncitizens.
In addition to challenges to indefinite detention, there have been increasing challenges to mandatory detention—the statute that allows ICE
to detain noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents, during the
pendency of their removal proceedings without the opportunity for a
bond (i.e., bail) hearing or individualized custody review.98 Initially however, the Court seemed less concerned about the constitutionality of preremoval order mandatory detention schemes. In 2003, the Supreme
Court considered Demore v. Kim99 and, despite amicus briefing by four former INS officials arguing that mandatory detention was both “unfair and
inefficient” while serving “no legitimate law enforcement purpose,”100 ultimately came down on the side of the government. The Court upheld the
mandatory detention regime, reasoning that the end goal of “preventing
deportable criminal aliens from fleeing” was a sufficient rationale for detention during this “limited period.”101 The majority’s decision in Demore
contains a number of misstatements of law and fact, among them that section 236(c) of the INA applies to a “limited class” or “subset of deportable
criminal aliens”—a far cry from the reality of this expansive statute.102 In
support of its holding, the Court averred, “ ‘[i]n the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.’ ”103
C. Post-Order Indefinite Detention of “Specially Dangerous”
Mentally Ill Noncitizens
Because there are regulations that suggest that the indefinite detention of certain mentally ill noncitizens104 is permissible, it is worth pausing
94. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
95. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
96. See Clark, 543 U.S. at 378
97. See id. (“To give these same words a different meaning for each category
[of aliens] would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012).
99. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
100. See Taylor, supra note 77, at 343.
101. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 526, 528.
102. See id. at 517–18, 521; see also Taylor, supra note 77, at 354.
103. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80
(1976)).
104. The author acknowledges and understands that “mentally ill” and “mentally incompetent” are distinct terms with unique meanings and that the two circles
may not be—and often are not—concurrent. That being said, because most re-
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here to consider this prospect and its bearing on the arguments that follow. As I explain, there is a procedural void for those mentally incompetent noncitizen respondents who are detained in a pre-order context.
The Court in Zadvydas considered the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1231
to the detention of noncitizens following a final order of removal. The
Court’s holding engendered a sort of “categorical approach”—that is,
there is one single factor—that the noncitizen’s removal is “reasonably
foreseeable”—that enters the calculus for continued detention.105 However, in so holding, the Court in Zadvydas analyzed civil and criminal
cases106 involving the detention of “specially dangerous” persons—where
courts have required a dangerousness rationale “be accompanied by some
other special circumstance, such as mental illness.”107 The Supreme
Court emphasized that in this instance, “strong procedural protections”
would be required and distinguished the circumstances surrounding detention for noncitizens.108 For example, in contrast to other civil detention, the detention of noncitizens post-order is “potentially permanent”
and applies broadly not only to suspected terrorists, but to noncitizens
“ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa violations.”109 The Court declined to find in favor of the government’s position, instead holding that there was nothing special or specially dangerous
about post-order noncitizens and that, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by
statute.”110
In the aftermath of Zadvydas, ICE promulgated a new regulation, codifying its own interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). ICE’s new regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 allows for the continued detention of noncitizens
determined to be “specially dangerous” whose removal is not reasonably
foreseeable because:
(i) The alien has previously committed one or more crimes of
violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16; (ii) Due to a mental condition or personality disorder and behavior associated with that
condition or disorder, the alien is likely to engage in acts of violence in the future; and (iii) No conditions of release can reasonably be expected to ensure the safety of the public.111
spondents who are found to be mentally incompetent will have a mental health
diagnosis, it is important to consider the regulations and rationale that may be
offered to justify their indefinite detention.
105. See Cat A. Itaya, Shadow Detention: The Federal Government’s Parallel System
for Detaining Mentally Ill Aliens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 100–01 (2011).
106. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
107. See id. at 691 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 368 (1997)).
108. See id. at 691.
109. See id. at 691, 696.
110. See id. at 699.
111. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii) (2017).
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Courts are split over the validity of this regulation. In Tuan Thai v.
Ashcroft,112 the Ninth Circuit considered the government’s argument upholding the validity of 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 and argued that it carves out an
exception allowing the indefinite detention of noncitizens under special
circumstances, such as the existence of mental illness, which makes the
respondent a danger to the community.113 The Court disputed the government’s reading of Zadvydas—noting that in fact, “the reference in
Zadvydas to special justifications and harm-threatening mental illnesses
was not a statement of what § 1231(a)(6) authorizes. It was instead an
explanation of why the Court felt it was necessary to construe the statute
narrowly.”114 Ultimately, the Court in Thai held unequivocally that, “[a]n
alien’s ill mental health coupled with dangerousness cannot justify indefinite detention under Zadvydas when dangerousness alone cannot justify
such detention.”115 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Tran v. Mukasey116 held
that as to the question whether the Supreme Court’s construction of
§ 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas (and now Clark) “permits an exception for the
continued and potentially indefinite detention of an alien deemed specially dangerous due to ‘a harm-threatening mental illness,’ ” the answer is
no.117
In stark contrast to the holdings of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, the
Tenth Circuit in Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson118 held that detention beyond the removal period for noncitizens satisfying the three criteria at
§ 241.14(f) raised “no serious constitutional question” and that the
agency’s interpretation of this regulation was owed Chevron deference.119
In reaching their decision, the court in Hernandez-Carrera concluded that
“special and narrow circumstances” were present in Hernandez-Carrera such
to avoid a constitutional problem and that the government’s interest in
the noncitizen’s continued detention was “particularly strong.”120 The
court held that because § 241.14(f) required enhanced procedural protec112. 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
113. See id. at 794.
114. See id. at 795 (“Consequently, interpreting the statute to avoid a serious
constitutional threat, we conclude that, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699)).
115. See id. at 798 (citation omitted).
116. 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008).
117. See id. at 482, 485; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377 (2005)
(stating that operative language providing for potentially indefinite detention applied “without differentiation” to all three categories of noncitizens that are its
subject (i.e. those noncitizens who have been ordered removed and are inadmissible, removable or, most relevant here, those who have “been determined by the
[Secretary] to be a risk to the community”) (citation omitted)).
118. 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008).
119. See id. at 1256 (“Because the Attorney General’s statutory interpretation
raises no serious constitutional question, and therefore represents a ‘reasonable’
interpretation of the statute, it is entitled to Chevron deference.”).
120. See id. at 1251, 1253.
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tions (namely the satisfaction of the three criteria mentioned above), and
because the burden of proof was now on the agency to prove dangerousness (rather than on the noncitizen to show non-dangerousness), that the
concerns of the Zadvydas court were sufficiently ameliorated.121
District courts that have considered the issue have generally found
such detention to be reasonable.122 Needless to say, it is unsettled
whether the indefinite detention of mentally ill noncitizens is permissible
under the regulations, as they have not yet been ordered removed. For
the purposes of this Article, the assumption is that such detention raises
significant constitutional problems and provides only further support for
the argument that immigration judges must be given explicit termination
authority for mentally incompetent respondents for whom other safeguards are inadequate.
In short, the current regulatory structure provides criteria and a process for the continued detention of a certain subgroup of mentally ill
noncitizen respondents post-order—no analogous procedure is outlined
for those mentally incompetent noncitizen respondents in a pre-order
context.
D.

Challenges to Prolonged Immigration Detention Without a Bond Hearing
Under Section 236(c) of the INA

Though there are several statutory bases for immigration detention
under the INA, this Article will now focus on those mentally ill and incompetent respondents who are detained, subject to section 236(c) of the
INA. These noncitizens are subject to “mandatory detention” and thus
generally ineligible for a bond hearing. As a result, where no safeguards
are sufficient to protect their rights in removal proceedings, these noncitizens have no way to request release from their seemingly indefinite detention. The remainder of this section will summarize challenges to
prolonged detention under section 236(c) of the INA for respondents
similarly situated to those detained noncitizens who have been found incompetent prior to an order of removal.
Because Demore dealt only with a “limited period”123 of mandatory detention, it fell on future courts to determine just what length of detention
121. See id. at 1252–57.
122. See, e.g., Reyes-Pena v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:CV-16-0042, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49798, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2016) (finding that petitioner was
properly detained under § 241.14(f)); Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 566, 574 (D. Md. 2010) (rejecting petitioner’s habeas petition and
finding that he was properly detained under § 241.14(f)(1), and that “8 C.F.R.
§ 241.14(f)(1) [was] a reasonable interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) entitled
to Chevron deference”).
123. In its 2003 opinion, the Supreme Court cited to government data that
showed that noncitizens were facing a “very limited” time in immigration detention, averaging just four months. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529 n.12
(2003). The Court relied on this in holding that such a time was too short to
trigger any constitutional right to a bail hearing. In August 2016, the Justice De-
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is authorized under section 236(c) of the INA. The three circuit courts to
have considered this issue have noted the serious constitutional problems
posed by prolonged mandatory detention and concluded that section
236(c) only authorizes detention for a limited period of time.
The Ninth Circuit has held that detention under section 236(c) of the
INA raises serious constitutional concerns after six months and that at
such time, the authority for continued detention shifts to section 236(a) of
the INA, thus entitling the respondent to a bond hearing.124 In a similar
but distinct vein, the Third125 and Sixth126 Circuits have construed section
236(c) as permitting mandatory detention for only a “reasonable” period
of time, which will clearly vary in each case. Notably, district courts in all
but five circuits have acted to limit prolonged mandatory detention under
section 236(c) and in such cases have either granted release from detention or a bond hearing.127 In fact, the Supreme Court has recently acpartment sent a letter to the Court acknowledging that this estimate was in error,
and that the average period of detention was actually more than one year. Jess
Bravin, Justice Department Gave Supreme Court Incorrect Data in Immigration Case, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2016, 03:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-departmentgave-supreme-court-incorrect-data-in-immigration-case-1472569756 [https://
perma.cc/S8Z3-5GDM].
124. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding, in case construing section 241(a)(6) of the INA, that detention is generally prolonged at six
months); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950–951 (9th
Cir. 2008); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that where Congress intended to authorize prolonged detention, beyond six
months, it did so expressly); Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that section 236(c) of the INA authorizes mandatory detention only during removal proceedings before the immigration judge and Board and only for
“expeditious” removal proceedings, not those that exceed the brief period of time
set forth in Demore).
125. See Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
Leslie v. Attorney Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2012).
126. See Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2003).
127. This includes the First Circuit. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 991 F. Supp. 2d
275, 281 (D. Mass. 2014); Ortega v. Hodgson, No. 11–cv–10358–MBB, 2011 WL
4103138, at *6 (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2011); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 455, 475 (D. Mass. 2010); Geegbae v. McDonald, No. 10-10852-JLT, 2010
WL 4292734, at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 1, 2010); Sengkeo v. Horgan, 670 F. Supp. 2d
116, 124 (D. Mass. 2009); Bourguignon v. MacDonald, 667 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181
(D. Mass. 2009). The Second Circuit. See, e.g., Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, 35 F.
Supp. 3d 533, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Monestime v. Reilly, 704 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Scarlett v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 632 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220
(W.D.N.Y. 2009); Hyppolite v. Enzer, No. 3:07-cv-00729, 2007 WL 1794096, at *1
(D. Conn. June 19, 2007); Fuller v. Gonzales, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-2039-SRU, 2005
WL 818614, at * 2 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005). The Third Circuit. See, e.g., RodriguezCelaya v. Attorney Gen., No. 1:CV–14–0514, 2014 WL 3557133, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa.
July 17, 2014); Skinner v. Bigott, No. 13–4299 (ES), 2014 WL 70066, at *4–5
(D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2014); Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F. Supp. 2d 759, 765 (M.D. Pa.
2013); Francois v. Napolitano, No. 12–2806 (FLW), 2013 WL 4510004, at *3
(D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2013); Banton v. Sabol, No. 3:CV–12–1594, 2013 WL 1736804, at
*4–5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2013); Bango v. Lowe, No. 3:12–CV–0822, 2012 WL
5955005, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2012); Martinez v. Muller, No. 12–1731, 2012
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cepted certiorari on this very issue.128 In Jennings v. Rodriguez,129 the
Court confronts the two most salient issues that have animated the postDemore detention cases—whether there is a constitutional limit on the duration of detention and who bears the burden of proof. To this end, the
Court is considering the following questions:
1. Whether aliens seeking admission to the United States who are
subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b) must be
afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the
United States, if detention lasts six months.
2. Whether criminal or terrorist aliens who are subject to
mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) must be afforded
bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if detention lasts six
months.
3. Whether, in bond hearings for noncitizens detained for six
months under Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1226(a), the alien is
entitled to release unless the government demonstrates by clear
and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger
to the community; whether the length of the alien’s detention
must be weighed in favor of release; and whether new bond hearings must be afforded automatically every six months.130
The remainder of this section will focus on the second question and
explain how mentally incompetent, detained respondents are like the respondents in Jennings. As the respondents in Jennings point out, all five
circuits to have considered this question have concluded that “Section
1226(c) must be read to include a limit on the length of detention it authorizes . . . [and] [n]o circuit has accepted the Government’s view that
Section 1226(c) mandates detention without a hearing for the duration of
WL 4505895, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012); Nwozuzu v. Napolitano, No. 12–3963,
2012 WL 3561972, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2012); Bautista v. Sabol, 862 F. Supp. 2d
375, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Pierre v. Sabol, No. 1:11–CV–2184, 2012 WL 1658293, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2012); Gupta v. Sabol, No. 1:11–CV–1081, 2011 WL 3897964,
at *1 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2011). The Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., Bracamontes v.
Desanti, No. 2:09cv480, 2010 WL 2942760, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2010), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 2:09cv480, 2010 WL 2942757 (E.D. Va. July 26,
2010). The Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Watkins, No. Civ.A. B:10-126, 2010
WL 6269226, at *8 n.15 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2010). The Sixth Circuit. See, e.g., Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (granting release). The
Eighth Circuit. See, e.g., Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp. 2d 905, 916 (D. Minn. 2007)
(granting release); Moallin v. Cangemi, 427 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915 (D. Minn. 2006)
(granting release). The Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., Jeune v. Candameres, 1:13-cv22333-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2013).
128. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
129. See Question Presented, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016)
(No. 15-1204).
130. Id.
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an individual’s removal case regardless of length.”131 Indeed, as the respondents point out, the circuits have uniformly agreed that detention
under section 1226(c) must be limited to a “reasonable” period and they
have diverged only in when and how to determine just what constitutes a
“reasonable” period of time.132 Despite these differences in application,
the consensus among courts to have considered the issue is clear: prolonged, pre-order detention absent meaningful opportunity to request release is impermissible. On December 15, 2016, the Supreme Court issued
a supplemental briefing order asking the parties to brief the constitutionality of several immigration detention provisions as well as questions related to the burden of proof.133 Some scholars have suggested that such
request suggests that the Supreme Court may be willing to confront head
on the constitutionality of prolonged immigration detention and to consider anew the plenary power doctrine, which has previously shielded
much of immigration law from meaningful judicial review.134
While mentally incompetent, detained respondents are similar to the
respondents in Jennings, they are different in important ways. Most notably, for incompetent respondents for whom no safeguards are adequate, a
bond hearing following a reasonable period of detention is an insufficient
remedy—especially if these respondents must bear the burden of proof in
showing non-dangerousness and non-flight risk, a burden which will be
nearly impossible for pro se respondents to satisfy.135 In Section IV(B),
this Article will examine why the potential promise of a bond or custody
hearing is not enough to protect the rights and prevent the unlawful, indefinite detention of incompetent, detained respondents.

131. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition on Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
at 1, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204).
132. See id. at 20 (“[E]very federal court of appeals to examine § 1226(c) has
recognized that the Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’
limitation upon the duration of detention that can be considered justifiable under
that statute.” (citing Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 494 (1st Cir. 2016))); Joint
Appendix at 75a–80a, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204);
see also Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2494 (2016); Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351
F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2003).
133. See Order in Pending Case (Dec. 15, 2016), Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S.
Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204).
134. See Kevin Johnson, Court Issues Supplemental Briefing Order in Immigration
Case, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 15, 2016, 08:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/12/court-issues-supplemental-briefing-order-in-immigration-case/ [https://
perma.cc/RHH8-VUM8].
135. See Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 75, 83 (2016) (discussing bond hearings for incompetent respondents without adequate safeguards and examining burden of proof in immigration
bond proceedings); see also Das, supra note 75, at 137 (explaining how burdens of
proof in immigration proceedings “create a presumption of mandatory
detention”).
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IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The role of the immigration judge is distinct and storied and has
evolved significantly over the last several decades. What follows is a brief
history of the role, authority, and scope of discretion exercised by immigration judges with an eye toward understanding the present-day power of
the immigration judge—and limits on that power—in the mental competency context. As the Board of Immigration Appeals, in particular, grapples with what authority immigration judges have in the mental
competency context, it’s worth pausing to examine the evolution of this
role and what power immigration judges presently possess to prevent the
shadow detention of mentally incompetent noncitizens.
A. The Role of the Immigration Judge
It may come as a surprise to learn that until midway through the twentieth century, immigration judges were not judges at all—but senior immigration officers, acting as part of the immigration enforcement regime.136
In fact, until 1996, they were called simply, “special inquiry officers” whose
job it was to act as both enforcer and adjudicator, opposing counsel and
decision maker.137 Concerns over this dual role—and the obvious conflicts it presented—surfaced in the Supreme Court’s decision in Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath.138 In Wong Yang Sung, the Court examined the
applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to deportation
proceedings. Finding that the purpose of the APA was “to curtail and
change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of
prosecutor and judge,” the Court held that deportation proceedings at the
time did not meet such standards of impartiality.139 Despite this decision,
because the INA exempted immigration proceedings from the requirements of the APA, the special inquiry officer as opposition and arbiter
remained unchanged at the time.140
However, the prospect for change took root with the enactment of
the INA in 1952, “which authorized the Attorney General to assign another immigration officer to present the evidence on behalf of the government and to carry cross-examination. This freed the special inquiry officer
for a more passive, judge-like decision making role.”141 Thereafter, the
1950s, 60s, and 70s heralded a series of additional reforms and increasing
professionalization of the courts. Changes included the creation of a
cadre of government trial attorneys, a change in title from “special inquiry
officer” to immigration judge, and the requirement that immigration
136. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 249 (5th ed. 2003).
137. See id.
138. 339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
139. See id. at 41, 50–51.
140. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 136, at 249.
141. See id.
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judges hold a law degree and wear black robes.142 Finally, in 1983, immigration judges were moved out from under the umbrella of the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and into the ambit of the
Department of Justice (DOJ).143 Subsequently, in 2003, the passage of the
Homeland Security Act severed ties once and for all—creating Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Department of Homeland Security, while immigration judges served under the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, a division of DOJ.144 However, notwithstanding this
division, immigration judges today remain under the authority of the Attorney General—the nation’s highest law enforcement officer, leading to
remaining questions about their perceived impartiality.145
Today, immigration judges are not formally administrative law
judges—despite efforts to convert their status to such146—but are defined
as “an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative
judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, qualified to
conduct specified classes of proceedings.”147 Immigration judges conduct
removal proceedings, administer oaths, receive evidence, may interrogate,
examine, and cross-examine the noncitizen and any witnesses, and, ulti142. See id. at 250; see also Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black
Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453, 454 (1988); James P. Vandello, Perspectives of
an Immigration Judge, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 770, 771 (2003) (noting requirement to
wear robes).
143. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 136, at 250.
144. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101).
145. For further discussion of suggested reforms to the role of immigration
judges, see Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2011) (noting problem of decisional independence but identifying related problems and advocating
for more inclusive resolution); Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal
Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. REV. 647, 709 (2012) (suggesting “micro-level changes”
related to “(1) cost and efficiency, (2) accuracy, (3) fairness, and (4) political acceptability”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1635, 1641–45 (2010); AM. BAR ASS’N COMMISSION ON IMMIGR., REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY,
AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 3–27 (2010), https:/
/www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocu
ments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9A4-HD
4T].
146. See Paul Verkuil et al., ACUS Report Discusses Immigration Adjudicators, 69
INTERPRETER RELEASES 775, 776 (1992); see also ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 2
REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992), https://archive.org/stream/gov.
acus.1992.rec.2/adminconf199202unse_djvu.txt [https://perma.cc/LMB4-4MM4]
(“[I]n submitting the bill, Senator [Edward M.] Kennedy commented: ‘[C]learly,
the responsibilities and duties of immigration judges are on an equal standing with
that of administrative law judges, in terms of both their level of authority and complexity of issues adjudicated.’ 137 Cong. Rec. S18417 (Daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).”).
147. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l) (2017). The regulation further specifies that
“[a]n immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform
such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe, but shall not be employed by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” See id.
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mately, make decisions about the inadmissibility or deportability of the
respondent.148 Questions about the scope of the immigration judge’s authority in the realm of mental competency and in making decisions about
whether, when, and how to close cases, will be taken up in the following
section.
148. For a more detailed explanation of the role of the immigration judge.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 (2017). The regulation reads as follows:
(a) Authority.
(1) In any removal proceeding pursuant to section 240 of the Act,
the immigration judge shall have the authority to:
(i) Determine removability pursuant to section 240(a)(1) of the
Act; to make decisions, including orders of removal as provided
by section 240(c)(1)(A) of the Act;
(ii) To determine applications under sections 208, 212(a)(2)(F),
212(a)(6)(F)(ii), 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 212(d)(11), 212(d)(12),
212(g), 212(h), 212(i), 212(k), 237(a)(1)(E)(iii), 237(a)(1)(H),
237(a)(3)(C)(ii), 240A(a) and (b), 240B, 245, and 249 of the
Act, section 202 of Pub. L. 105–100, section 902 of Pub. L.
105–277, and former section 212(c) of the Act (as it existed
prior to April 1, 1997);
(iii) To order withholding of removal pursuant to section
241(b)(3) of the Act and pursuant to the Convention Against
Torture; and
(iv) To take any other action consistent with applicable law and
regulations as may be appropriate.
(2) An immigration judge may certify his or her decision in any case
under section 240 of the Act to the Board of Immigration Appeals
when it involves an unusually complex or novel question of law or
fact. Nothing contained in this part shall be construed to diminish
the authority conferred on immigration judges under sections
101(b)(4) and 103 of the Act.
(b) Withdrawal and substitution of immigration judges. The immigration judge assigned to conduct the hearing shall at any time withdraw if
he or she deems himself or herself disqualified. If an immigration judge
becomes unavailable to complete his or her duties, another immigration
judge may be assigned to complete the case. The new immigration judge
shall familiarize himself or herself with the record in the case and shall
state for the record that he or she has done so.
(c) Conduct of hearing. The immigration judge shall receive and consider material and relevant evidence, rule upon objections, and otherwise
regulate the course of the hearing.
(d) Withdrawal of application for admission. An immigration judge may
allow only an arriving alien to withdraw an application for admission.
Once the issue of inadmissibility has been resolved, permission to withdraw an application for admission should ordinarily be granted only with
the concurrence of the Service. An immigration judge shall not allow an
alien to withdraw an application for admission unless the alien, in addition to demonstrating that he or she possesses both the intent and the
means to depart immediately from the United States, establishes that factors directly relating to the issue of inadmissibility indicate that the granting of the withdrawal would be in the interest of justice. During the
pendency of an appeal from the order of removal, permission to withdraw an application for admission must be obtained from the immigration judge or the Board.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.1.
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B. Scope of the Immigration Judge’s Regulatory Authority
As detailed above, immigration judges have only that authority delegated to them by the Attorney General.149 The matters over which immigration judges have jurisdiction are, in some ways, limited and narrowly
circumscribed, providing that immigration judges may determine removability and adjudicate certain applications for relief from removal.150 The
Board has further clarified the limited regulatory power of immigration
judges. For example, an immigration judge may not order discovery151 or
waive certain application fees.152
Citing typically to the (non-binding) EOIR Immigration Judge
Benchbook, some have suggested—and this Article agrees—that immigration judges do have the, albeit nonbinding, authority to terminate removal
proceedings in the case of a respondent’s incompetence.153 Others have
cited to the regulations themselves154—in particular, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.12(c) which states clearly that, “[t]he order of the immigration
judge shall direct the respondent’s removal from the United States, or the
termination of the proceedings, or other such disposition of the case as may be
appropriate.”155 Though 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c) seems clear on its face,
there is no Board precedent—or more precise statute or regulation—that
149. See Matter of Fede, 20 I. & N. Dec. 35, 35–36 (B.I.A. 1989) (“The Board
and immigration judges . . . only have such authority as is created and delegated by
the Attorney General.” (footnote omitted)).
150. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(i) (describing matters over which immigration
judges have jurisdiction); see also Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 I. & N. Dec. 335,
339 (B.I.A. 1991) (stating that immigration judges “have no jurisdiction unless it is
affirmatively granted by the regulations”).
151. See Matter of Henriquez Rivera, 25 I. & N. Dec. 575, 579 (B.I.A. 2011)
(holding that immigration judge erred when ordering DHS to provide respondent’s complete United States Citizenship and Immigration Services record to immigration court).
152. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7, 1103.7 (2017).
153. See EXEC. OFF. OF IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
JUDGE BENCHBOOK (2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judgebenchbook-mental-health-issues [https://perma.cc/BLZ3-D49Q] (explaining that
termination may be appropriate “where respondents are unable to proceed in
light of mental health issues and a corresponding inability to secure adequate safeguards, as required by section 240(b)(3) of the Act.”). But see Yao v. I.N.S., 2 F.3d
317, 319 (9th Cir. 1993) (“As the B.I.A. points out, the IJ was not empowered to
terminate or suspend proceedings once initiated.” (citation omitted)); Matter of
Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971) (finding no discretionary authority to
terminate); Matter of Vizcarra-Delgadillo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 51, 52 (B.I.A. 1968)
(holding that special inquiry officer could terminate proceedings only where both
parties agreed).
154. See Decision of Immigration Judge, Matter of K.D. (Feb. 26, 2015) (copy
on file with author).
155. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c) (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.50(c)
(“The order of the immigration judge shall direct the respondent’s deportation, or
the termination of the proceedings, or such other disposition of the case as may be
appropriate. . . . [T]he immigration judge is authorized to issue orders in the
alternative or in combination as he or she may deem necessary.”).
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provides that an immigration judge may terminate a case to ensure fundamental fairness in the event of an incompetent respondent. Even so, some
immigration judges are exercising their discretion to order termination
based on a respondent’s incompetence, though, at least anecdotally, this
practice varies widely by judge and court.156 While an immigration judge
does have clear regulatory authority to terminate removal proceedings in
some instances,157 the case of a respondent’s incompetence is less clear.
On the other hand, and relevant here, the Board has said that “seeking
treatment for the Respondent” could be a basis for administrative closure,
but did not expand further.158 Release to treatment or termination of
proceedings in order to seek the treatment that is demonstrably unavailable in immigration custody is a logical advancement of the Board’s
guidance.
Despite the Board’s narrow interpretation of an immigration judge’s
authority to terminate,159 federal courts have held that, in fact, removal
proceedings should be terminated when regulatory violations impact a respondent’s fundamental rights in the removal proceeding.160 In Montilla
156. See generally Sherman-Stokes, supra note 12, at 1055–57 (2016) (describing vastly different experiences and outcomes of practitioners seeking termination
in case of mentally incompetent respondent at ten sites across country); see also
generally Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(suggesting that immigration judge did right thing when she correctly “terminated
the removal proceedings” in the case of lawful permanent resident respondent,
Ever Franco Martinez-Rivas, whose schizophrenia rendered him incompetent and
unable to proceed).
157. See 8 C.F.R § 1235.3(b)(5)(iv) (“If the immigration judge determines
that the alien was once so admitted as a lawful permanent resident or as a refugee,
or was granted asylum status, or is a U.S. citizen, and such status has not been
terminated by final administrative action, the immigration judge will terminate
proceedings and vacate the expedited removal order”); 8 C.F.R § 1239.2(f) (“An
immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for naturalization
when the alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization and the
matter involves exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors; in every other
case, the removal hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding the pendency of an application for naturalization during any state of the proceedings.”) ; see also Matter of Hidalgo, 24 I & N. Dec. 103, 103 (B.I.A. 2007)
(holding that “[b]ecause the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration
Judges lack jurisdiction to adjudicate applications for naturalization, removal proceedings may only be terminated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2006) where
the Department of Homeland Security has presented an affirmative communication attesting to an alien’s prima facie eligibility for naturalization” (citation
omitted)).
158. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 483 (B.I.A. 2011).
159. See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I. & N. Dec. 43, 45, (B.I.A. 2012)
(noting immigration judge’s improper termination of proceedings and explaining
that, “[o]nce jurisdiction vests with the Immigration Judge, neither party can compel the termination of proceedings without a proper reason for the Immigration
Judge to do so”).
160. See Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993); Montilla v. I.N.S.,
926 F.2d 162, 166–70 (2d Cir. 1991).
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v. I.N.S.,161 the then INS failed to adhere to its own regulations concerning a noncitizen’s right to counsel. Montilla, a long time lawful permanent resident, was detained and facing removal for a drug conviction.
During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge advised the respondent of his right to counsel, but there was no waiver and no clear
answer as to whether the respondent wished to avail himself of this right.
Ultimately, the Court in Montilla held that because the right to counsel is a
fundamental right—tracing its roots back to original schemes of Due Process—then where such a right is violated, proceedings may be terminated.162 Additionally, some scholars have suggested that immigration
judges possess the statutory and regulatory authority to engage in proportionality review.163 Professor Wishnie has argued that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(1)(A) should be construed to include a restriction on the imposition of a removal order where such imposition would be “excessive.”164 Applying the canon of constitutional doubt, Professor Wishnie
argues that, “a statute permitting the immigration judge to enter a removal order that was grossly disproportional to the underlying misconduct
would raise a serious constitutional problem.”165
Though the authority of the immigration judge is restricted in certain
areas, in the realm of mental competency, the opposite is true. In fact,
immigration judges presently exercise broad authority and discretion to
make decisions and determinations regarding the mental competency of a
respondent—without the benefit of a mental health evaluation or the
opinion or testimony of a mental health professional—as well as what safeguards might be adequate to protect the respondent’s rights in removal
proceedings.166 In these instances, the authority of the immigration judge
is vast. They can allow a friend or family member to sit with the respondent during their proceedings, can waive the respondent’s presence, or
help the respondent to reserve their appeal rights.167 An immigration
judge can also alone be the decider of mental competency, without the
benefit of a mental health evaluation, power that, for example, is not exercised by a criminal court judge.168
Despite an immigration judge’s substantial authority and discretion
when it comes to matters of mental competency, immigration judges re161. 926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).
162. See id. at 170.
163. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2012).
164. See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement,
2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 445 (2012).
165. See id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
166. See, e.g., Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1047–48 (C.D.
Cal. 2010); Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (B.I.A. 2011); ShermanStokes, supra note 12, at 1045; EOIR, Phase I, supra note 46.
167. See M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483 (listing suggestions of safeguards that
immigration judge can implement).
168. See EOIR, Phase I, supra note 46; see also M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 474,
477. For further discussion see Sherman-Stokes, supra note 12.
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main, in many cases, unclear on their authority. When an incompetent
respondent is required to go forward in a proceeding where their fundamental rights cannot be adequately safeguarded, termination is appropriate and immigration judges should be explicitly authorized to render such
a decision. However, absent clear and unequivocal regulatory authority to
terminate in the case of a respondent’s mental incompetence (and often
over DHS objection), immigration judges are reluctant to act.
V. REGULATORY CHANGES SHOULD

BE

UNDERTAKEN

To varying degrees, where courts have considered the issue, they have
concluded that whether pre- or post-removal order, prolonged and indefinite detention of noncitizens is suspect. Moreover, prolonged and indefinite detention is an even greater risk for this subgroup of mentally
incompetent detained noncitizens, for whom there are no satisfactory safeguards. In order to maintain compliance with the Rehabilitation Act, regulatory changes should be undertaken to ensure that immigration judges
have clear authority to order the release or termination of proceedings for
certain mentally incompetent respondents for whom no adequate safeguards are available. While a reasonable accommodation does not require
an organization to make a “fundamental” or “substantial” alteration to its
programs, reasonable adjustments may be required to assure “meaningful
access.”169 Such a reasonable adjustment in the nature of the benefit can
help ensure that these respondents have meaningful access to the courts,
in compliance with section 504.170 Though the role and authority of immigration judges is constrained in some areas, immigration judges maintain broad and unique authority and discretion in the context of mental
competence.171
This Article proposes that the regulations be amended to clarify an
immigration judge’s explicit authority to release a respondent or to terminate removal proceedings, where a respondent’s mental competency prevents the imposition of adequate safeguards and where, in the absence of
such safeguards, prolonged and indefinite detention will result. Simply
put, the Department of Justice and the EOIR should write regulations stating that where a respondent is incompetent and competency restoration is
not reasonably foreseeable then the immigration judge has the authority
to release the respondent or terminate the proceedings, even over an objection by DHS trial counsel assigned to the case—such is the “reasonable
accommodation.”
169. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300–01 (1985).
170. See id. at 302 n.21.
171. See Matter of M-J-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 773, 773 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that,
“[i]n cases involving issues of mental competency, an Immigration Judge has the
discretion to select and implement appropriate safeguards”); M-A-M-, 25 I. & N.
Dec. at 477, 481–82 (“Based on the statutory and regulatory parameters, we conclude that Immigration Judges have discretion to determine which safeguards are
appropriate, given the particular circumstances in a case before them.”).
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A. The Regulations Should Be Amended to Prevent the Prolonged and
Indefinite Detention of Mentally Incompetent Respondents
Immigration statutes and regulations that explicitly address the presence of mental illness or mentally ill and incompetent respondents are not
novel. Indeed, the INA has long excluded the mentally ill, in vulgar
terms,172 since at least the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the power
and authority of the United States to exclude noncitizens on this basis has
repeatedly been upheld.173 Today, although a mental disorder cannot be
the sole basis for exclusion from the United States, it remains a ground of
inadmissibility when coupled with associated harmful behaviors.174 The
regulations also contemplate the presence of mentally ill and incompetent
respondents in removal proceedings by excusing the presence of a mentally incompetent respondent and suggesting safeguards to protect respondent’s rights and privileges.175 To amend the regulations to
specifically contemplate the possibility of release or termination in certain,
narrow circumstances, would be both prudent and with precedent. As discussed above, the prospect of prolonged and indefinite detention is very
real for those detained incompetent respondents for whom no safeguards
are adequate. Without regulatory change,176 the mentally incompetent
172. See Immigration Act of 1891 § 1, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (excluding
large classes of noncitizens including, “[a]ll idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge”); see also Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.) (prohibiting entry of those “afflicted with psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or a mental defect”); Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (banning those immigrants with “psychopathic personalities”);
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 § 3, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952) (targeting intending gay and lesbian immigrants and prohibiting admission of “person[s] of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” who were certified
by physician to be mentally ill). For a more thorough discussion of the history of
exclusion of noncitizens based on mental illness, see Jennifer Blakeman, The Exclusion of Mentally Ill Aliens Who May Pose A Danger to Others: Where Does the Real Threat
Lie?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 287, 288 (2000); Polly J. Price, Infecting the Body
Politic: Observations on Health Security and the “Undesirable” Immigrant, 63 U. KAN. L.
REV. 917, 919 (2015) (examining exclusion of “undesirable” immigrants through
case study comparing exclusion of those suspected of Ebola and mentally ill);
Mark C. Weber, Opening the Golden Door: Disability and the Law of Immigration, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 153, 155 (2004) (describing history of disability based exclusion immigration policy).
173. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 10–11 (2002) (noting Supreme Court’s repeated assertions of the doctrine
of inherent powers “over immigrants in entry and exclusion proceedings”).
174. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
175. Se id. § 1229a(b)(3) (“If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental
incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General
shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”); 8
C.F.R. §§ 1240.4, 1240.43 (2017).
176. Of course, in the context of administrative law, change can happen both
by notice and comment rulemaking and regulation or by adjudication. There is a
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will be subject to a kind of shadow detention, wherein their rights are
unprotected and their confinement is potentially indefinite.177 Their resultant inability to meaningfully exercise their rights and access the courts
violates section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Critics are apt to point out that a regulation allowing for termination
by the immigration judge is only a partial solution—termination of removal proceedings will mean the likely immediate release of some mentally incompetent noncitizens, which could be seen as “preferential
treatment.” It’s worth noting that the Rehabilitation Act contemplates
and allows for such results—indeed, the Act acknowledges “that preferences
will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.”178
Moreover, critics may point out that some of those released may have
criminal convictions.179 While this is true, there are potential safeguards
to ensure the provision of mental health care, as well as ICE supervision if
appropriate.
In the first instance, in considering the subset of mentally incompetent respondents impacted by these changes, there may be room for some
kind of additional procedure, namely coordination with state mental
health services. For example, under amended regulations, immigration
judges could potentially condition release or termination of removal proceedings on the respondent—or, more likely, a friend, family member,
guardian ad litem, or health care provider180—petitioning the state for
possibility then that the Board of Immigration Appeals could solve this problem by
issuing a precedential decision. Though very likely to be quicker, a notable downside of this approach is that adjudication can be undone by the stroke of the Attorney General’s pen.
177. For a discussion of one version of what this might look like, see Itaya,
supra note 105, at 105 (examining application of 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 and arguing
that such regulation allows noncitizens to be detained under shadow federal
scheme that bypasses civil commitment procedures which would grant more procedural protections to mentally incompetent respondents).
178. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Barnett to hold that accommodation may result in preference for disabled
individuals over otherwise similarly situated nondisabled individuals).
179. This Article does not endorse the myth that the mentally ill are more
likely to be violent or commit crimes. Indeed, the research bears out that the
mentally ill are, in fact, not any more likely than the general population to offend.
See Press Release, American Psychological Association, Mental Illness Not Usually
Linked to Crime, Research Finds (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.apa.org/news/
press/releases/2014/04/mental-illness-crime.aspx [https://perma.cc/DGX645X5]. However, this Article does recognize that the mentally ill in mandatory
ICE detention have typically been convicted of crimes and that there may exist
concerns about their likelihood of recidivism if released. But see Mark Noferi,
Mandatory Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption of Dangerousness, in
IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS 215, 232–33 (Maria João Guia
et al. eds., 2016) (noting that, “[A] criminal conviction is not necessarily a ‘reliable
indicator’ of dangerousness—particularly minor convictions, many of which trigger mandatory immigration detention.” (footnote omitted)).
180. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § 6 (West 1990). For example,
in Massachusetts, an applicant of any age may apply for Department of Mental
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services through a department of mental health (DMH).181 In Massachusetts, for example, this requirement would trigger a state level examination of the respondent’s mental disorder(s), their duration, and any
resultant functional impairment, potentially resulting in care and treatment provided by the state.182 Because the Department of Homeland Security has made clear that it has no intention of effectively treating certain
incompetent respondents,183 and a recent yearlong investigation determined that “the [immigration] detention system often fails to protect vulnerable immigrants with psychiatric disorders,”184 a requirement to at
least begin the process of soliciting state services prior to release or termination could provide a safety net of care and treatment for this vulnerable
group.
Additionally, ICE could act to require post-release supervision. In the
Zadvydas context, the statute and regulations provide for post-release supervision, including the terms and conditions of such supervision.185
Though specific to the post-order context in which prolonged detention
has resulted from DHS’s inability to repatriate a noncitizen, the statute
and regulations seem to contemplate mental illness—making reference to
conditions of release that include rehabilitative programming and “psychiatric examination.”186 This Article does not suggest that continued
post-release supervision of mentally incompetent noncitizens is necessarily
desirable or practical; however, if narrowly tailored and implemented with
an eye toward rehabilitation rather than enforcement, it may ameliorate
concerns about the release of mentally incompetent noncitizens. That beHealth services and a program or facility, or health care agent, may also apply on
the applicant’s behalf. See id.
181. Similar questions are being considered in a case currently pending
before the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Amicus Invitation No. 16-06-21 (Commitment to Mental Health Facility), supra note 65 (considering relationship between
civil commitment and release from immigration detention where respondent’s
mental illness suggests that she poses both danger and flight risk if released).
182. See 104 MASS. CODE REGS. 29.04 (2009). In Massachusetts, to be approved for Department of Mental Health (DMH) services, an individual must meet
the clinical criteria as described at sections 29.04 (2)(a) or (2)(b) of title 104 of
the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, be determined in need of DMH services,
and have no other means for obtaining the services, as described at sections 29.04
(3)(a), (b), (c), and (d) of title 104 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, and
DMH has available capacity to provide the services as described at section 29.04
4(b) of title 104 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations. See id.
183. Decision of the Immigration Judge, Matter of K.D. (Dec. 1, 2015) (copy
on file with author) (in which DHS asserts that it, “could not and would not . . .
provide treatment” of the incompetent Respondent while she was detained in their
custody).
184. Siegelbaum, supra note 6.
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h) (2017).
186. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h) (“The order of supervision may also include any
other conditions that the HQPDU considers necessary to ensure public safety . . .,
including, but not limited to, attendance at any rehabilitative/sponsorship program or submission for medical or psychiatric examination, as ordered.”); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3) (referencing same).
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ing said, it is also worth considering whether the immigration detention
and removal regime really has the expertise and competence to be making
decisions at the crossroads of mental illness and criminal behavior. For
example, in special immigrant juvenile cases, we leave the decision as to
whether a child has been abused, abandoned. or neglected to state authorities, due to their unique training and experience in this realm.187 Analogously, it is worth considering whether decisions about competency,
mental illness, rehabilitation, deterrence, and recidivism should be left to
the systems explicitly designed to consider these issues.188
B. Alternate Solutions Are Unreliable, Inefficient, or Implausible
DOJ and the EOIR should amend the regulations because an amendment to the regulations is the only viable solution to ensure compliance
with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Alternate solutions to the prospect of prolonged and indefinite detention of the mentally incompetent
are unreliable, inefficient, or implausible.
First, as detailed in Section III, challenges to mandatory detention
without a bond hearing under section 236(c) of the Act have been increasingly successful and have now reached the Supreme Court. While the potential of a newly created right to a bond hearing after six months189 will
provide a promising opportunity for many detained noncitizens, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings is still unknown. While it is easy to
assume that the Court will come down on the side of the circuit courts to
have considered the issue—finding that there is a limit to the length of
detention authorized by section 1226(c)—the Court could rule otherwise.
For example, the Court could hold that prolonged pre-hearing detention
is permissible. This would not resolve the problem facing mentally incompetent respondents who cannot be afforded adequate safeguards. These
respondents cannot proceed to a hearing, seek appeal, or otherwise pursue relief because there are no safeguards sufficient to protect their rights,
but if the Court held this way, they would also be ineligible for a bond
hearing because they are detained prior to the entry of an order of removal, or “pre-order.”
187. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); see also Laila Hlass, States and Status: A Study
of Geographical Disparities for Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 266, 267
(2014) (describing process in juvenile, family, or probate court for youth seeking
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status).
188. Whether or not these systems—civil commitment and the criminal justice system, respectively—are adequately addressing and responding to these issues
is a topic well outside the scope of this Article. Moreover, the success or efficacy of
these systems is likely to vary greatly, from state to state and even county to county,
throughout the United States.
189. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016); see also Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492, at 10 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
23, 2013).
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Even if the Court in Jennings upholds the right to a bond hearing after
six months, a bond hearing in itself does not guarantee release. Bond
procedures and determinations rely on the statute, regulations, and Board
case law.190 In Matter of Patel,191 the Board held that a noncitizen “is not
and should not be detained or required to post bond except on a finding
that he is a threat to the national security, . . . or that he is a poor bail
risk.”192 In Patel, and a number of subsequent early cases, the Board made
clear that liberty was the default.193 But, as a result of changes in the
statute and regulations, it is now clear in law and in practice that the detainee—in this case, a mentally incompetent detainee who may be proceeding pro se—bears the burden of proof in bond proceedings to prove
that she is neither a danger to persons or property.194 In making this determination, an immigration judge can consider a number of factors including whether the respondent has a criminal history of any kind, as well
as criminal charges that did not result in a conviction.195 Scholars have
noted the many problems with this allowance, for example that hearsay
from police reports is often introduced in bond hearings without making
police officers available for cross examination.196 If, after a consideration
of the evidence presented, the immigration judge finds that the respondent is a danger to persons or property, the analysis concludes and the
respondent will remain detained.197 If, however, the immigration judge
finds that the respondent is not a danger, then the immigration judge may
proceed to consider whether the respondent is a flight risk. In making a
flight risk determination, an immigration judge may consider multiple fac190. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1; In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
572 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2003); Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (B.I.A. 2006);
Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1103 (B.I.A. 1999); Matter of Patel, 15 I. &
N. Dec. 666, 667 (B.I.A. 1976).
191. 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 1976).
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., Matter of Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 489 (B.I.A. 1987); Matter of Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979); Matter of Spiliopoulos, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 561, 563 (B.I.A. 1978); Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666; see also Holper, supra
note 135 (describing changing history of burden of proof in bond proceedings).
194. See Holper, supra note 135 (describing changing history of burden of
proof in bond proceedings and examining both laws of 1996 and follow-on regulation in 1997 in which the then INS “flip[ped] the presumption of freedom for its
initial custody determinations for all detainees” and not just those in certain, specified categories, and arguing that in order to ensure that detention comports with
Due Process, it should be Government’s burden, by clear and convincing evidence,
to prove that detainee is dangerous and flight risk); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(placing burden on detainee to prove they are not flight risk); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1.
195. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 38.
196. See Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 675, 732 (2015) (arguing that, “blind reliance on police reports has
pervaded immigration judges’ decisions to deny bond, to deny discretionary relief,
and, in some cases, to find noncitizens removable”).
197. See Matter of Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141–42 (B.I.A. 2009) (holding
that only if judge finds that detainee is not dangerous, can judge then go on to
consider flight risk).
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tors198 including whether the respondent has a fixed address in the
United States;199 the respondent’s length of residence in the United
States;200 family ties in the United States;201 employment history in the
United States, including length and stability of such employment;202 as
well as the respondent’s immigration record.203 It is worth noting that
several of these factors are very likely to prejudice the mentally ill and
incompetent, who are less likely to maintain a fixed address204 and stable
employment205 and whose mental illness may have distanced them from
family members in the United States.206 With these factors working
against them, the mentally ill and incompetent are, it would seem, in every
way less likely to receive a favorable bond determination.207 Finally, a
bond hearing requires substantial documentation and advocacy, a tall or198. See generally Matter of Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1981) (noting that factors to consider when analyzing bond case include “employment history”; “length of residence the in community”; “family ties”; “record of
nonappearance”; criminal violations; immigration violations; and eligibility for relief from removal).
199. See, e.g., Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666,
666 (B.I.A. 1979).
200. See, e.g., Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; Matter of Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec.
488, 489–90 (B.I.A. 1987); Matter of Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 178 (B.I.A. 1979).
201. See, e.g., Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 489;
Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 178; Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 667.
202. See, e.g., Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 489–90;
Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 178–79; Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 666–67.
203. See, e.g., Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 489;
Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 178; Matter of San Martin, 15 I. & N. Dec. 167, 168 (B.I.A.
1974); Matter of Moise, 12 I. & N. Dec. 102, 103 (B.I.A. 1967).
204. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., THE 2010 ANNUAL HOMELESS
ASSESSMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS iii, 18 (2010), https://www.hudexchange.info/
resources/documents/2010HomelessAssessmentReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BR78-R56W] (noting that, “[m]ore than half of adults in PSH [Permanent Supportive Housing] had a substance abuse problem, a mental illness, or both” and
“an estimated 46 percent of sheltered adults . . . had a chronic substance abuse
problem and/or a severe mental illness”)
205. See Judge David L. Bazelon, Getting to Work: Promoting Employment of People
with Mental Illness, BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L. (Sept. 2014), http://
www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Getting-to-Work.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7GGF-SB2P] (noting that, “[t]he likelihood of a person with a serious
mental illness having full-time employment is approximately 1 in 10” (citing U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL FINANCING OF SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT
AND CUSTOMIZED EMPLOYMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: FINAL REPORT vii
(2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2011/supempFR.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/7484-D9ZX])); see also Bazelon, supra, at 2 n.5 (noting that only 16.9%
of all people served by state mental health systems were employed).
206. Social disconnectedness is a hallmark of mental illness. See, e.g., Erin
York Cornwell & Linda J. Waite, Social Disconnectedness, Perceived Isolation, and Health
Among Older Adults, 50 J. HEALTH SOC. BEHAV. 31, 32–33 (2009).
207. But see Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 37 (holding that “the Immigration Judge
has wide discretion in deciding the factors that may be considered” which arguably
could mean that immigration judges could consider, and give significant weight to,
respondents’ mental illness as positive factor favoring release).
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der if a mentally incompetent, detained respondent is seeking bond pro
se.208
A second alternative for indefinitely detained noncitizens could be
habeas proceedings. After all, the Respondents in Zadvydas and Clark
brought successful habeas challenges to their indefinite detention. But
habeas challenges are complex and time consuming.209 Moreover, habeas
review takes custody determinations out of the immigration court—where
immigration judges arguably have the unique “institutional competence
and individualized knowledge to efficiently conduct the review.”210 Especially considering that mentally incompetent respondents, who are generally not entitled to counsel,211 would be required to write and file habeas
petitions from detention,212 the promise of habeas producing timely or
successful results seems illusory. Additionally, federal court involvement
can be slow, cumbersome and “wastefully duplicative.”213
208. See Das, supra note 75, at 157 (describing many hurdles faced by pro se
immigration detainees trying to secure evidence in support of their request for
bond).
209. See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 603 (2010) (explaining that, “[f]ederal
[habeas] litigation is complex, resource-intensive, and time-consuming. Moreover,
the legal framework for mandatory detention is a fluid network of statutes, and
courts are apt to deem cases moot when the legal authority for detention shifts
from one statute to another” (footnote omitted)).
210. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
23, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204); see also Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that habeas approach raises “a question of institutional competence” since “federal courts are obviously less well
situated to know how much time is required to bring a removal proceeding to
conclusion”).
211. But see Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1061 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (awarding plaintiffs “Qualified Representative(s) who is willing and able to
represent Plaintiffs during all phases of their immigration proceedings, including
appeals and/or custody hearings”); see also EOIR FOIA Response, supra note 48
(showing that the Phase I Plan has been rolled out in Denver, Colorado; El Paso,
Texas; Houston, Texas; and Miami, Florida). Even so, it is not at all clear that this
representation would extend beyond immigration court and into federal district
court, which is where the habeas challenge would be brought.
212. See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief in Opposition on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23–24, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204). Respondents in Jennings argued that bond is preferable to habeas because it “ensures
that noncitizens—many of whom are unrepresented and lacking in the legal sophistication needed to file a habeas petition—are in fact able to obtain review of
whether their detention remains reasonable despite its length.” See id. (citing Lora
v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 615–16 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2494
(2016)).
213. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that,
“Not only may ‘the underlying removal proceedings justifying detention . . . be
nearing resolution by the time a federal court of appeals is prepared to consider
them,’ but it is also likely that the evidence and arguments presented in a ‘reasonableness’ hearing before a federal court are likely to overlap at the margins with the
evidence and arguments presented at a bond hearing before an immigration
court. This inefficient use of time, effort, and resources could be especially bur-
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Finally, congressional action could amend the statute to provide
clearly for termination in the case of a mentally incompetent respondent.
Unfortunately, in today’s congressional climate, such action seems improbable. Of course, congressional inaction is not new—Truman’s campaign against a “Do-Nothing Congress” is well documented.214 But
congressional inaction and obstructionism is, in some areas, unprecedented today.215 On immigration matters in particular, congressional inaction, intransigence, and obstructionism is now the norm.216 Given these
realities, and the increasingly polarized political climate on immigration
matters in particular, it seems implausible to expect that congressional action would or could remedy this problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a recent case involving an incompetent, detained respondent, for
whom no safeguards were adequate, the immigration judge concluded,
“[t]he Court has serious reservations about the practical implications of
the Respondent’s continued detention in DHS custody.”217 It is the case
of detainee Martin, whose story is described in the introduction, and it
seems that the immigration judge shared these concerns. After significant
advocacy, and prolonged detention for Martin during which time little to
no treatment was provided him, his removal proceedings took a rare and
unusual turn. With the tacit agreement of the attorney for the Department of Homeland Security, Martin’s proceedings were ultimately terminated and Martin was released from custody. Martin’s case was unusual.
The prolonged, and indeed potentially indefinite, detention of mentally
incompetent noncitizens pre-removal order and in violation of the Rehabilitation Act is a growing reality. Courts across the country have consistently struck down prolonged, pre-order detention and have read a
“reasonableness” limitation into the statute, requiring a custody review
densome in jurisdictions with large immigration dockets.” (quoting Lora, 804 F.3d
at 615–16 (internal citation omitted))).
214. See President Harry S. Truman, Speech in Elizabeth, New Jersey: Know
Nothing, Do Nothing Congress (Oct. 7, 1948), http://www.speeches-usa.com/
Transcripts/harry_truman-nothing.html [https://perma.cc/PQL5-XR76].
215. See, e.g., Patrick Caldwell, Senate Republicans Are Blocking Obama’s Judges at
a Nearly Unprecedented Rate, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/11/senate-republicans-block-obama-judgenominations/ [https://perma.cc/K4MJ-JECU]. But see Megan Mcardle, Unprecedented Congressional Obstructionism Is Actually Quite Precedented, ATLANTIC (Oct. 11,
2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/10/unprecedentedcongressional-obstructionism-is-actually-quite-precedented/246513/ [https://
perma.cc/4U5L-87GL].
216. See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, Boehner Refuses to Act on Immigration Reform,
WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/11/06/boehner-refuses-to-act-on-immigration-reform/ [https://
perma.cc/7MPP-TCRC].
217. See Decision of the Immigration Judge, Matter of K.D. (Dec. 1, 2015)
(copy of decision on file with author).
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hearing when detention exceeds this limit. Indeed, in Jennings, the Supreme Court has recently accepted certiorari on this issue. As the United
States continues to detain record numbers of noncitizens facing deportation, it is unlikely that the number of mentally ill and incompetent in detention will decline. Actions by the EOIR and decisions at the BIA, as well
as the success of class action litigation, have resulted in some positive
strides in recognizing that this vulnerable population requires specially tailored procedural protections to ensure their rights are safeguarded—both
under the United States Constitution and the Rehabilitation Act. And
while these measures have certainly provided some significant additional
protection, the risk of prolonged and indefinite detention, and denial of
meaningful access to the courts, remains. The EOIR should amend the
regulations to grant immigration judges explicit authority to order release
or termination of removal proceedings for mentally incompetent, detained noncitizens where there are no safeguards available that can adequately protect their rights. Alternatives, including bond hearings, habeas
challenges, or congressional action, are either unreliable, inefficient, or
implausible. Without this critical regulatory fix, incompetent, detained
Respondents like Martin and others—many of whom are longtime lawful
permanent residents—face potentially prolonged and indefinite detention in ICE custody, where they will be unable to access meaningful treatment, rehabilitation, or the opportunity for release.
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